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Abstract
In this paper we present a security framework for Bond, a message-oriented distributed

object middleware for network computing. Bond Security Framework, BSF, allows
developers to exercise perfonnance-security tradeoffs and use the security model best
suited for a specific application and for a given environment. BSF consists of an
extensible core and a set of well defined security interfaces. Any Bond object can become
a secure object when extended with a dynamic property called bondSecurityContext.
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1. Abbre....iations and Terms
Bond Object - a collection of data fields and methods. The data component of an object
consists of several fields defined at compile-time and dynamic properties defined at runtime.
Message-oriented system - a distributed system whose components communicate only by
means of messages. Messages are used to implement remote data access and remote
procedure calls. Every message in Bond is a sentence in the KQML agent communication
language.
Bond sub-protocol - a closed subset of KQML messages, a specialized language to
perform a task. Each Bond message is stamped with the sub-protocol it belongs to. A
Bond object understands all sub-protocols implemented by its own class or inherited from
its ancestors.

Bond probe - an object that implements a certain sub-protocol and can be attached to
another object as a dynamic property to extend messaging capability.
Preemptive probe - a probe that intercepts all incoming and outgoing messages.
Bond security context - a preemptive probe that implements security·related functions.
When attached to a Bond object, it sets up a security perimeter for the object and
intercepts every incoming and outgoing message to enforce security and access control.
Secure Bond Object - an object augmented with a security context.
Security 1l1terface - defines a set of common methods to access an object that implements
a security and an access control modeL
Credential- a secret code that can prove the identity of an individual.
Authentication - the process of ensuring that an individual is whom he/she claims to be.
Access Control - the process of granting or denying access to a resource, usually based on
authentication.

2. Introduction to Distributed Object Security and Network Computing
Network computing is a novel paradigm that emphasis the use of computational resources
distributed over the network versus local resources. Several network computing
architectures are possible, e.g. client-server, three-tier, transaction-oriented, etc. The
phenomenal success of the World Wide Web has generated an interest in a Web of
distributed objects capable to support network computing.
Security is an important concern for any network environment, as information in transit is
vulnerable, and the use of resources in different administrative domain introduces issues
of trust and consistency between them. A distributed object system poses new challenges
to security mechanisms. For example security auditing should be able to identify
correctly the principal, the original issuer of a request, even after a chain of calls
involving multiple objects. There is also the need of delegation, the propagation of
attributes of the principals between components. Delegation allows one component to act
on behalf of a principal.
Applications of network computing have vastly different security requirements and the
trade-off between security and performance are application specific. It is unfeasible to
consider one security model suitable for all applications and all environments [1].
Additional security challenges posed by network computing are discussed below. The
user population and the resource pool are large and dynamic. A user may only be aware
of a small fraction of the components involved in a computation. The relations among
components may be rather complex, a component may act both as a server and a client at
the same time. Traditional distributed systems use RPC or TCPIIP as their primary
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communication mechanism. In contrast, a distributed computing environment may use
two-sided communication mechanism like message passing, streaming protocols,
multicast, and/or single-sided get/put operations, as well as RPc. Components may
communicate through a variety of mechanisms.
The boundaries of trust are more intricate because of dynamic characteristic of
components. The trust users have in components is threatened when components can be
mobile between hosts and new components can be created on the fly. Boundaries of trust
are more complex because an activity typically involves multiple domains with different
security policies and security models. Computation may be distributed to many more
machines than any given user has control over.
Research in distributed computing security identifies several criteria and principles for
security design [2,3]. Granularity, consistency, scalability, flexibility, heterogeneity and
performance are important aspects of distributed object security. A security design
implies trade~off among these requirements. For example strong security and good
perfonnance are competing requirements. Coarse-grain security is easier to manage than
fine-grain.
We survey now two security approaches, taken by Globus and Legion projects. Globus is
a research effort to design computational grids [I]. Security is achieved through GSI,
Globus Security Infrastructure. The grid environment consists of multiple trust domains collections of subjects, participants in a security operation and objects - resources being
protected, governed by single administration and a single security policy. GSI does not
replace or override local policy decision, consequent!y, it focuses on controlling the interdomain interactions and the mapping of inter-domain operations into local security
policy.
When global and local subjects exist, for each trust domain, there exists a partial mapping
from global to local subjects. The existence of the global subject enables the single signon. Operations between entities located in different trust domain require mutual
authentication. An authenticated global subject mapped into a local subject is assumed to
be equivalent to being locally authenticated as that local subject. All access control
decisions are made locally on the basis of local subject. By enforcing security at the
domain level, GSI implements coarse granularity security easy to manage and scale.
Legion is an object-oriented distributed computing environment [4]. Security in Legion is
centered on the object level, making every object responsible for ensuring its own
security [5]. Every object class decides who is permitted to communicate with that object.
Rather than having a set of standard rights, every object will permit access on a permethod basis.
Legion provides a security framework rather than a specific implementation. Every
Legion object may have a number of hooks, whereby additional functionality can be
attached. These hooks are used for authentication, message encryption, access control,
and delegation. These hooks can be left undefined, or they can be as complex as the
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object implementor desires. These hooks are implemented as member functions that are
declared in some base classes but can be overridden as desired in derived classes.
May! is the Legion function responsible for enforcing access control. This function is
implicitly called whenever an object attempts to invoke one of the object's member
functions. Optionally, May! could issue licenses/tickets that permit later function calls to
bypass it for a limited time or number of invocations.

Legion implements a very thin granularity security by providing security at the object
level. Yet the only way to change the security models of an object is to override the
implementation of the security hooks, it is not possible to modify dynamically the
security model of an existing object when the environment has changed.
In Bond we opted for an extensible core object that can support multiple security models

and can be added dynamically to existing object. This philosophy leads to several design
principles. The fIrst is to provide a framework for security, not force an implementation.
Bond leaves the decision of choosing the fonnat of credentials, the authentication policy,
the access control policy, and so on, to the system developer or the system administrator.
BSF is implemented as an extensible core Bond object called BondSecurityColltext and a
set of well~defined security interfaces.
The second design principle is that various aspects of a complex object design, including
security, should be separated from one another. In the initial design and implementation
phase the creator of an object should only be concerned with functionality. Once the
object is fully functional the creator needs to investigate the security requirements and
augment the object with the proper security context by including a probe called
BondSecurityColllext. This dynamic property of a Bond object sets up a secure perimeter
for the object, it intercepts all incoming and outgoing messages and enforces the security
and access control models selected by the creator of the object.
The third design principle is to support multiple authentication and access control
models. This goal is achieved by defining a common interface for different security
functions, like credential, authentication and access control.
The paper is organized as follows. Next section provides an overview of Bond. Section 4
outlines security and access control models. Section 5 presents the architecture and the
implementation of the Bond Security Framework. Applications are discussed in Section
6, followed by a summary.
3. Dynamic Properties of Bond Objects
Bond is a message-oriented middleware, for network computing [6]. It consists of a
communication fabric and several frameworks. Bond servers are active objects providing
long~term services for a group of users active in a Bond domain. Servers provide a
variety of services e.g. directory service, authentication, persistent storage, versioning.
Agents are active objects providing scheduling, brokerage, and so on. More infonnation
about Bond is available elsewhere [7,8].
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Bond objects are persistent network objects, that communicate with each other, can be
instantiated and run remotely, and can be saved on persistent storage. They communicate
with each other through messages. Some objects are active, they have one or more
threads of control running, e.g. servers, agents, others are passive, e.g. the metaobjects
used to annotate data, programs and hardware.

The upper segment of the Bond object hierarchy is presented in Figure l. In this
hierarchy, bondObject implements the common fields of all Bond objects (e.g., name,
unique bondID, address, static fields, and dynamic fields). The static fields are declared
during compile time and are implemented as data fields of the class. The dynamic fields
are created during run-time and are implemented in the internal hash table.
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Figure 1. The upper part of the Bond object hierarchy. The subprotocols implemented by
class definitions appear in parenthesis.
A property of a Bond object is a pair consisting of a name and a value object. The value
object can be a single value or a collection of properties. For example, the name could be
"credential" and the value bondPAPCredential, an object that holds the usemame and
password. Bond objects have static and dynamic properties and implement them by
means of static and dynamic fields. The following example shows the implementation of
a credential as a dynamic property. The property consists of name, "credential" and an
instance of bondPAPCredential class as value object. Two static fields, username and
password are available in class bondPAPCredential. The get() and set() methods provide
access to static and dynamic fields of a bondObject. Both methods check the property
names in the static fields before searching the Hashtable that holds the dynamic
properties.
Class bondPAPCredential extends bondObject {
String usemame;
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String password;
}

Class MyProgram extends bondObject {
bondPAPCredential mycredential = new bondPAPCredentialO;
mycredential.set("usemame", "hao"); Ilcreation of usemame property
mycredential.set("password", "abcde"); Ilcreation ofpassword property
this.set("credential", mycredential);
1/ creation ofquote property
bondPAPCredential mycredential = this.get("credential");
)

Bond uses KQML, Knowledge Querying and Manipulation Language [9J, as an interobject communication language. A KQML message consists of a peifonnative and a set
of order-independent parameters. The peifonnative encodes basic abstractions like
asking, replying, achieving, subscribing, etc. The number and semantics of parameters
are dependent on the peifomzative except some reserved parameters.
A sub-protocol is a subwset of KQML messages [8J. It contains messages needed to
perform a particular task and it is closed in the sense that the reply or acknowledgement
to a message is always a member of the same sub-protocol. Each message is stamped
with the sub-protocol it belongs to. Examples of Bond sub-protocols are given in [8J. The
objects that implement a sub-protocol understand its syntax and semantics. For example,
two objects that implement the PropertyAccess sub-protocol can remotely interrogate and
set each other's properties.
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Figure 2: The handling of an incoming message. The message is passed along the object
hierarchy to the say () function of the bondObject that implements the PropertyAccess
subwprotocol.
Bond objects are grouped together in containers. A Bond resident is such a container and
consists of several threads of control, a local directory and a communication interface.
Bond is based upon active messages, every incoming message is delivered to the say()
function of the destination object by the messaging thread of the container where the
object is located. The say() function implements the parsing and handling of the message.
The say() function is either inherited from a parent or overridden by the object. The subprotocol implementation is also inherited. If an incoming message is not understood, it is
passed to the say() function of the immediate ancestor in the object hierarchy until the
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message is understood or there are no more elements in the hierarchy. Every object can
understand the PropertyAccess sub-protocol implemented by the root of the object
hierarchy as shown in Figure 2.
Bond uses the concept of probe [8] to add new functionality to a Bond object
dynamically. A probe is an object that implements a certain sub-protocol and it is
attached to an object as a dynamic property. The implementation of a bondObject
exploits inheritance and examines the list of dynamic properties to process incoming
messages. When an object cannot understand a message by tracing the object hierarchy, it
searches its list of dynamic properties looking for a probe that can handle the subprotocol the message belongs to and leaves the message handling to the probe. For
example, the Bond Monitoring Framework is based upon monitoring probes [10], a<;
shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3. The effect of augmenting an object with a probe. The destination object,
bondDirectoryServer, does not understand the monitoring sub-protocol. The message is
passed along the hierarchy to the say () function of the hondObject but none of the
ancestors understand the sub-protocol. Finally, the messaging thread searches the
dynamic of properties of the destination object, detects a probe that understands the subprotocol and delivers the message to it.
The Bond security framework is based upon the concept of preemptive probe, an
abstraction that supports the aspect-oriented design outlined above. A preemptive probe
is a special probe activated before any attempt is made to deliver the message to the
object, it intercepts all messages sent to the object. Figures 3 and 4 show the strategies
used to deliver a message to an object. The set of dynamic properties of an object is
searched first looking for a preemptive probe. If the preemptive probe is not found, then
the message is passed along the object hierarchy. Finally, if no ancestor of the object
understand the sub-protocol, then the dynamic properties of the target object are searched
for a regular probe able to understand the sub-protocol. Multiple probes and only one
preemptive probe may be attached to an object.
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Figure 4. The bondDirectoryserver object has a preemptive probe attached to it and a
monitoring message is handled by the probe.
4. Security and Access Control Models
Security in a network environment includes authentication and access control [11][12].
Authentication refers to the process of identifying an individual, usually based on a
username and password. Access Control is the process of granting or denying access to a
network based on a two~step process, authentication to ensures that a user is who he/she
claims to be, and access control proper which allows the user access to various resources
based on the user's identity.
Some of the authentication models are [3]:
(1) PAP - Password Authentication ProtocoL The most basic fonn of authentication, the
user's name and password are transmitted over the network and compared to a table of
name-password pairs. Typically, the stored passwords are encrypted.
(2) CHAP - Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol. The authentication agent,
typically a network server, sends the client program a key to encrypt the username and
the password.
(3) Kerberos - ticket-based authentication. The authentication server assigns a unique
key, called a ticket, to each user that logs on to the network. The ticket is then embedded
in every message to identify the sender of the message.
(4) Certificate-based authentication. This model is based on public key cryptography.
Each user holds two different keys: public and private. The user can get a certificate that
proves the binding between the user and its public key from a third party. The private
key is used to generate evidence that can be sent with the certificate to server side. The
server uses the certificate and evidence to verify the identity of the user.

A credential is a secret code that proves the identity of an individual. Authentication
models use different credentials, e.g. username/password in PAP and CHAP, user
identifier/ticket in ticket-based authentication, and user certificate/private key in the
certificate-based authentication.
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Access control models includes firewall and access control list, ACL. Firewall grants or
denies access based upon the IP address of the requester. An access control list specifies
what operations a user may perform on each resource.
5. The Architecture and Implementation of BSF
BSF is implemented through an extensible core called BondSecurityContext and a set of
well-defined security interfaces. BondSecurityContext is a preemptive probe that
establishes a defense perimeter for the object it is attached to, by intercepting incoming
and outgoing messages using two methods: incomingMessageProcess() and
outgoingMessageProcess() as shown in Figure 5.
Local Message Thread

1

I 11""""'Ing~O""'DO I
Proco... O

I<-

r-.

I~··"M·-~ll
Proco.,[)

1

I
Masler
Object

Figure S. Message flow for an object with a preemptive probe, bondSecurityContext
attached to it.
A BondSecurityContext contains security-related objects that implement various security
functions. Each of these objects implements one of the security interfaces defined by
Bond:
BondCredentiallnterface - defines the method to access the credential possessed by the
current BondSecurityContext. The format of a credential was discussed in the previous
section. This interface provides two groups of methods:
(I) Methods to respond to authentication request from a remote object. Usually a
challenge is contained in the authentication request, and the response is derived from
both the challenge and the information provided by the credential. The response is
generated differently in different security models.
(2) Methods to generate a user identifier and the proof to be embedded in each outgoing
message and prove to the receiver the identity of sender. The proof has different
meaning in different security models. In a usemame/password model, the proof can
be a password, or an encrypted password, in a ticket based security model, the ticket
itself can be the proof, in a certificate-based model, the evidence generated by
encrypting a random string with the private key can be an eligible proof.
BondAuthenticatorInterface - defines the authentication method for each message
received by an object. The developer or the administrator may deploy one of the
9

authentication models mentioned earlier. The only restrIction is to adhere to this
interface. The only method provided by this security interface is authenticateClientO. that
returns an authenticated user identifier. This identifier can be used for access control or
auditing.
BondAccessControllnteiface - defines the access control method for each message
received by an object. The methods provided by this security interface are initACL() and
checkRight() based upon the authentication models discussed earlier.

The current implementation of bondSecurityContext supports authentication and access
control in the incomingMessageProcess() method, as shown in Figure 6, and credential
setup in the outgoingMessageProcessO method. Figure 6 also shows several objects that
implemented the security interfaces defined above. Member variable bcs is a collection of
credentials needed for accessing different services, every element inside this collection
implements the BondCredentialInteiface; Member variable bau is a authenticator object
that implements the BondAuthenticatorlnteiface; Member variable bac is a access
controller object that implements the BondAccessControlbuerface;

bondSecurltyContextoxlonds bondPrOlJe (
privale IJondCredenllals
bcs;
prlvale bondAulhenUcatorlnterlace
prlvale bondAccessConlrolinlerlace

bau;
bee;

II IncomlngMessageProcess Is called by the messege
II lhread on each received message
pubtlc void IncomlngMesse.gaProcess(m. sendar){
II Step' .aulhenllcete the received message
authenUcaled_user_ld co beu.aulhenllcaleCllenl(m);
II( authentlcated_user_ld ~ null){
sender.say( sorry message);
retum;

II Slep 2.enforce access control
result co bac.checkRlght(authanUcated_user_ld.m);
II( resull ~ .. lalseH
sendar.say( sorry message ):
return;

/I Slap 3.send Ihe passad message 10 the object
parenl.say(m. null);
)
)

Figure 6. BondSecurityContext member variables and the incomingMessageProcess()
method. Steps I, 2 and 3 enforce authentication, access control, and message delivery
respectively.
A developer may implement application specific security models by adhering to the
defined security interfaces, and deploy these implementations in the BondSecurityContext
object. For example, the member variable bau can be set as an authenticator that
implements the certificate-based authentication model. The only requirement is it must
implement the bondAuthenticatorlnterface interface.
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A developer may derive a new class from bondSecurityContext and override the
incomingMessageProcessO and outgoingMessageProcessO. For example one may add
accounting and logging functions.
Table I lists the authentication models and Table 2 lists the access control models
implemented in Bond release 2.0.

Tvn.
Usemame and
Plain oassword
Challenge Handshake
Authentication Protocol
(CHAP)

Bond Credential Interfaces
bondPAPCredentiai

Bond Authenticator Interfaces
bondPasswordAuthenticator

bondCHAPCredential

bondChallengeAuthenticator

Table I. Authentication models in Bond.
All authenticators in Table 1 need a Bond Authentication Server maintalrnng the
usernames and the passwords. If the service provider uses one type of authenticator in
Table I, the client object should use the corresponding credential in Table 1 to make the
authentication feasible.
Tvne of access control
IP address based
(Firewall)
Access control list

Access Control Interface
bondlPAddressAccessControl

Reouired authenticator
-

bondNameBasedAccessControl
Or
bondRil!htBasedAccessControl

bondChailengeAuthenticator
or
bondPasswordAuthenticator

Table 2. Access control models implemented in Bond.
6. Applications
The following example illustrates how to construct secure objects using BSF. Assume
that we have a Bond domain consisting of one client, two generic servers and an
authentication server that provides account management and authentication services. The
client uses an existing account (uid=hao and passwd= abcde) to access services provided
by the two servers. One of them, server_A enforces plain password-based authentication
and firewall-based access control, while servecB enforces CHAP-based authentication
and name-based access control.
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Figure 7. A Bond domain consisting of a client, two computational servers and an
authentication server.
The sample code to setup server_A as a secure object enforcing plain password-based
authentication and firewall-based access control is presented in Figure 8. The steps
involved in this process are: (1) create a new server object server_A, (2) create a plainpassword based authenticator bau and a firewall-based access controller bac, (3) create a
security context called gatekeeper and set bau and bac as the authenticator and the access
controller respectively, and (4) set gatekeeper as the security context of server_A.

I
server server_A = new server();
If create an authcnlicator for the slXurity context
bondPasswordAuthenticator bau = new bondPasswordAuthenticator(baservcr);
"create an access controller and initialize it
bondIPAddrcssAccessControl bac = new bondIPAddressAccessConlrolO;
bac.initACL(nfirewall.acl n);

If create a security contcxt for the newly created objcct
bondSecuriryConlcxt gatekeeper =new bondSccurityContcxl(server_A);
If seL Ihe access controller and authenticator of this security context
galekccper.setAccessControl(bae);
gatekeeper.setAuthcnticator(bau);
"set the sccurity context as a dynamic propeny of the object
scrvccA.seISecurilyConlcxl(gatekeeper);

I

Figure 8. Sample code to create a secure server enforcing plain password-based
authentication and firewall-based access control.
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The format of the access control list file 'firewall.acl' is:
* Firewall configuration file consisting ofpairs <hostname> <mask>
uhuru.cs.purdue.edu 255.255.255.0
Hosts in the same sub-net with the machine uhuru.cs.purdue.edu can access server_A.
The procedure to create a secure object enforcing CHAP-based authentication and namebased access control presented in Figure 9 consists of the following steps: (1) create a
new server object server_B, (2) create a CHAP based authenticator bpau and a namebased access controller bac, (3) create a security context called gatekeeper and set bpau
and bac as its authenticator and access controller respectively, and (4) set gatekeeper as
the security context of the server.
The format of the access control list file names.ael is:
*
* Name based ACL, the format of this file is as following
* <name> <rightl,right2,rightN>
hao persistent-object-read,persistent-object-write

This means that user hao is allowed to save objects to and reload them from this server.
The parameter baserver, is used to create the authenticators in both cases. This means
server_A and server_8 share the account information stored in the baserver, the
authentication server of the domain.

I
5C/"I"CT =_B= new set\'ef(};
/I creole an num.n~l;111or for using in the securily conlext

bonI!01allcngl:Authcn~cator

bpan" new bcndChal!o:ngeAuthemicnlor(b;tnrva);

/I Crt:alC llCC= controller :IlId inWilize il
bondNameB...edAcc=Control b;u; " IlCW bondNamc:BascdAcccssCnntroIO;
bac.jnltACl(·n~.acl·);

If cre:lle n secority conlext which II... the server objecl os thema.<ra object
bondSel:urilyConro::<t g3lekecpcr " new hondSccurilyContexl(5CfVcCB);
/I sel the nca:s,,; conlrOlia and iluthc:nlicnlor Dr Ibis secorily conlut

gillCkccpcr.SClAcccs..lControl(bac);
galelceq.er, serAuthenricnlor(bp.:lu);
/I >eI. the securily conle;J;t IlS n d)nnrnic propcny Dr server object
SC1'VC1'_B.SClSecuril}CODtt<Xt(gnldecpcr);

I

Figure 9. Sample code to create a secure server enforcing plain password-based
authentication and IP-based access control.
Now consider the client side. The procedure to setup a secure client object shown in
Figure 10 shows involves the following steps; (1) create a new client object elio, (2)
create a security context bsc for the object (3) create a bondPAPCredential bel to hold
the usemame and password, and set it as the credential for accessing server_A in the
security context, (4) create a bondCHAPCredential bc2 which to hold the usemame and
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password, and set it as the credential for accessing server_B in the security context, and
(5) set bsc as the security context of the client object. The security context of the client
adds the corresponding credential to each request sent to one of the server objects without
the client intervention.

I
client clio = new clienlO;

1/ create asecurity context which has the client as master objecl
bondSecurityContext bsc =new bondSeturityContext(clio);

1/ setup aPAP credenUal which contains the usemame and password
bondPAPCfeden~al bcl =new bondPAPCredential('hao','abcde');
bsc.SelCredentia(bc1, 'server_A');
1/ setup aCHAP credential which contains the username and password
bondCHAPCredentiallx:2 = new bondPAPCredential('hao','abcde');
bsc.seICredential(bc2, 'serverB');
/I setup this security cootext as clienrs security colllexi
clio.setSecurityConlexl(bsc);

I
Figure 10. Sample code to create a client able to interact with the two secure servers.
A scenario involving the interaction between the client and servecA is shown in Figure
11. The client sends a service request to server_A. This request is intercepted by the
security context of the client, which inserts the username hao and the password abcde
and then sends the message. Messages reaching servecA are intercepted by its own
security context which enforces authentication and access control. If the service request is
validated the server object grants the service.
Client Object

Client's Security
Context

Server_A's
Security Context

Service request
contains usemame
and password

Service granled

Figure 11. Processing of a service request.
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Server~

Object

The scenario illustrated in Figure 11 is appropriate when the server trusts the identifier
and the proof contained in a message. But the identifier and proof can be captured by a
malicious third party and used to obtain unauthorized access to the server. To prevent
such attacks, the security context of the server may use a stronger authentication scheme
as shown in Figure 12.
CionlObjoot

5""'01_8".
soeurily Coolo"

01",,1'0 SOCllrUlI
Conlo.1

Figure 12. Processing of a service request using CHAP credential.
The client sends a service request message to server_B. The security context of the client
does not modify the message because it detects that a bondCHAPCredential is used. The
message is captured by the security context of server_B. The authenticator component of
the security context of the server sends a challenge to the credential component of the
security context of the client and expects a response derived from both the challenge and
information contained in client's credential. Then the authenticator uses the challenge and
corresponding response to authenticate the client. If the service request is validated, the
server object grants the service.

7. Summary
In this paper we present Bond Security Framework. We opted for an extensible core

object that can support multiple security models and can be added dynamically to
existing object. We decided to provide a framework for security, not force an
implementation. Bond leaves the decision of choosing the format of credentials, the
authentication policy, the access control policy, and so on, to the system developer or the
system administrator. BSF is implemented as an extensible core Bond object and a set of
well-defined security interfaces.
Various aspects of a complex object design, including security, are separated from one
another. In the initial design and implementation phase the creator of an object should
only be concerned with functionality. Once the object is fully functional the creator needs
to investigate the security requirements and augment the object with the proper security
context by including a preemptive probe. This dynamic property of a Bond object sets up
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a secure perimeter for the object, it intercepts all incoming and outgoing messages and
enforces the security and access control models selected by the creator of the object.
We support multiple authentication and access control models. This goal is achieved by
defining a common interface for different security functions, like credential,
authentication and access control.
The security framework presented here

IS

included

In

the current Bond release,

ht[p:/lbond.cs.purduc.cdu.
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